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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
fi,\'ION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff 
-vs.-
~T"\'l'E TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant 
Case No. 
10710 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing 
S'l'ATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE 
PETITION 
This is a Petition for Rehearing of the Court's 
1ll'l'ision on the ground the Court not only committed 
c·nor i11 cone 1 uding that the word "commercial" in 
~r·etion 59-l:i-4 (b) (2), U.C.A., 1953, (the statute in-
nh·ll) is unambiguous and clear, but also in failing or 
1··f11>ing to recognize the legislative meaning as estab-
'i,hed br the undisputed and stipulated facts in the 
i'1·1·1mi. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In its decision filed March 13, 1967, the Court I 
that "the legislature intended to exclude from tax 1;1, I 
fuel oil which industrial concerns use in the busines' ri; 
fabricating merchandise which, when completed, wuni,: 
be subject to a sales tax and that a sales tax is intcnr]1,1 
to be imposed on railroads which are primarily r111rn~11' 
in commerce, that is, in trade rather than industn nr ,, 
in the fabrication of merchandise.'' 
On the basis of that holding the Court ordmrl 1lw' 
the determination of the State Tax Commission L 
affirmed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION FOR REHEARm 
Plaintiff seeks ( 1) a reversal of the erroneous ro1; 
struction placed by this Court on the statute involrerl,. 
to-wit, that "commercial" includes all "trade" (rail·! 
roads are considered to be in trade rather than industry! 
and that the "industrial" exemption is limited to tl1 1 
fabrication of merchandise; and (2) a ruling, in arro11i 
ance with the intent of the legislature, that the raihwl 
industry in Utah is exempt from the sales aml use t111 · 
on its purchase and storage of fuel oil for the propul,iu1 
of locomotives. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts of this case are the suhjerl ,it 
stipulation set out in the record at pages 7 through i: 
3 
,,,,,] ; 1n• dig-l'sted in plaintiff's brief at pages 2 through 9. 
1,.1.,,rdi11gly they are not again recited herein . 
. \RGll~IENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PE'l1 ITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Bcra11sP of the substantial effeC't of the Court's de-
:i~ion in this casP on all railroads doing business in this 
·'';111·, 1'1ir• Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
l'ompan~-. Ronthern Pacific Company and "\Vestern Pa-
,jfir Hnilroacl Company, whiC'h, along ·with plaintiff, con-
,(itntc all of the Class I railroad companies doing busi-
liPR~ in TTtah, petitioned the Court for leave to file an 
n111ir1 rnrioe liri0f in support of plaintiff's Petition for 
R0hc·nring. B)- rourt order dated March 30, 1967, said 
11etitioners were granted such leave. Accordingly, they 
lwreli~- join with Union Pacific Railroad Company in the 
frillo1ring arg-11mcut and brief in support of plaintiff's 
i'ctitio11 for Hehcaring. 
POINT I 
THJ1~ COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THFJ R'I' A TUTE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE 
IR CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
On p<t\!,'P 2 of its green sheet decision, the Court 
'i:ib: "\V0 do not think there is any ambiguity in the 
·1 nt11t" im·oh-Pcl herein." 
.\g-;1i11, on page :3: "It is not any ambiguity in the 
11 'r 11l1i1·li f.(iYrf' the occasion for this lawsuit, but it is 
4 
the application of the facts to the law whirh bring:;; 11
1
,. 
matter to the court's attention." 
We respectfully disagree with these staterne 11 1, 
In fact, and entirely contrary to the court's concln~io1t. 
plaintiff has proceeded under the conviction that (1
1
, 
main reason for this lawsuit was the ambiguity iu 
the meaning of the word ''commercial,'' and thcrefori· 
to apply the proper definition to that term as it appear, 
in and is a part of Se0tion 59-15-4 (b) (2), UCA, 1933, :, 
is necessary to look to all available and proper sonrn 
to determine and carry out ·what the legislature ltarl i11 
mind. By its nature the term "commercial" can de11ol1 
as broad or as narrow a meaning of business as 1rn, 
wishes to ascribe to it. The fact that it inherently prr:. 
duces more than one interpretation is aptly pointed on1 
by reference to the Tax Commission's "flip flop" aJ : 
ministrative constructions over the past twenty-tw• 1 
years. (R. 20, 21, 23) 
The wide gamut of meanings and senses which th 
term is capable of producing, and has produced (and t!P 
creation of an ambiguity or uncertainty of meaning re 
quires only two variable interpretations) is graphicall: 
illustrated by the definitions of "commercial" in fa\ 
Corpus Juris Secundum, pages 1 and 2: 
''The word 'comercial' is defined as menrn11 ~ 
mercantile· occupied with commerce; relati11!.! 1" 
or dealing 'with commerce; of the nature of c~ni 
merce; of or pertaining to commerce; pe.~-t_a,m1 ~1,; 
or relating to commerce or trade; deincd. · 
commerce or trade ; engaged in trade; han11 ~ 
financial profit as the primary aid. 
5 
"The term 'commercial,' in its broad sense 
comprehends all business and industrial enter-
prises, and in a comprehensive sense it includes 
ocrnpations and recognized forms of business en-
terprise which do not necessarily involve trading 
in merchandise as well as buying, selling, and ex-
change in the general sales or traffic of ( Ameri-
ran) markets, although, when limited to the pur-
chase and sale or exchange of goods and com-
modities, it is said to be used in a narrow and 
restricted sense. Thus it has been said that in its 
narrow sense it includes only those enterprises 
which are engaged in the buying and selling of 
g-oods. It has also been said that there is noth-
ing- erroneous or irrational in interp·reting the 
word 'commercial' as including farming activities. 
"Used in a broad sense, it includes 'industrial,' 
ancl iR sometimes synonymous with 'business.'" 
Apart from general definitions, the cases have uni-
form]~- recognized the indistinct and questionable mean-
i11g: of the term "commercial" as it appears in innumer-
able shitntes and ordinances throughout the country. 
-incl, npon Rneh recognition the courts involved haYe 
rarefnlly reviewed the legislative background invoh-ed 
aml wn1ilahle in order to arrive at the proper legislative 
intrnt. For example, the court prefaced its consideration 
ufthe meaning of "commercial" in Reiser v. Meyer, 323 
SW 2J G14, 521 (1\fo., 1959), as follows: 
''A reading of the cases shows that the term 
'commercial' or the phrase 'commercial purposes' 
are not susceptible of exact definition. They are 
gi1-en different meanings under varying circum-
stanees and depend on the circumstances under 
which they are used.'' 
6 
Similarly, in United States v. Public 8ercice (' 1, , . 
Colorado, 143 F. 2d 79 (10th Cir., 1944), at page 81, 11
11
• 
court said: 
"The term 'commercial' may have a hroatl 111 
a narrow meaning. In its broad meaIJing it rm·rim 
passes industrial enterprises or all hnsiness. Jii 
the narrow meaning of the term 'commerl'ial' j, 
included only those enterprises engaged in tl
1 
buying and selling of goods. The legislafae l1i'. 
tory ... would indicate that Congres8 wa~ usi11~ 
the word 'commercial' in the re8trictrd Nl'l1i1 
rather than the broad sense.'' 
In Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 49 S.Ct. 4i, i.~ 
L.Ed 214 (1928), at page 127 the court says: 
"While in a narrow and restricted sense tl:i 
terms 'commerce,' or 'commercial,' and 'trndt 
may be limited to the purchase and sale or •1\ 
change of goods and commodities, they may con 
note, as well, other occupations and other rero~­
nized forms of business enterprise which do wJ' 
necessarily involve trading in merchandise." 
And, in Colorado Contractors Ass'n v. Public [.'/iii ' 
ties Commission, 262 P.2d 266 (Colo., 1953), the couJ'i', • 
analysis is as follows: 
" 'Commercial' pertains to commerce .... Tl 11 ~ 
term 'commerce,' it is said, is not susceptihlr 111 
exact or comprehensive definition, and the qn«' 
tion of what is commerce is to be approached bot! 
affirmatively and negatively. 11 Am .. Jur. i.' 1 
C.J.S. Commerce, Section 1, page 256. It is g"11 '' 
different meanings under varying cireumsla1'."'. 
in the interpretation of certain statutes allll il1'1 
trines. It has been stretched out of all )ll'l'1' 111 
d · otlJ11r· tion in some instances and contracte m 
7 
fn the main, it should be declared to mean that 
which the legislature had in mind by its use in 
t lie particular statute under consideration." 
Sec also City of Sioux Falls v. Claeland, 75 S.D . 
. i±8, 70 N.W. 2d 62, 64 ( S.D., 1955) ; State ex rel. J( arnsas 
('dlf Poirer & Light Company v. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 
S.W. (2<1) 513 (Mo. 1938); and Mecha1iical Farm Equip-
111e1if Distributors v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 296 (9th Cir.1946). 
Based upon the foregoing consideration of the criti-
l"<tl term imTolved, it is difficult to see how the court ar-
riwd at its view that the statute in this case is clear and 
rPrtnin. ArJparently it follows from the comments on 
pnge 2 of the green sheet, which state: 
''Fuel oil and coal are taxed only if sold or 
furnished for domestic or commercial consump-
tion. We would not expect the legislature to pre-
determine whether or not any given concern was 
engaged in domestic or commercial activity. That 
is a factual question to be initially determined by 
the 'l1ax Commission and ultimately by this 
court.'' 
While that statement may be true with respect to 
the proprr application of the legislative intent on a case-
1,!"·case hasis, it completely slides over and leaves un-
~ll~\1·erec1 the critical issue in this case: What did the 
l't:1li lcgi:o;latnre mean by the phrase "furnished for ... 
'
1Jtmner('ial eonsumption'' ~ 
\Yliilc eouccding that the legislature is not expected 
Ir j 'j . 1 r ce1r r rn advance whether or not any or every con-
' 
1
' 111 i.~ eommercial in nature, where that body has set 
8 
tlown a meaningful legislative definition of that otlin. 
wise questionable term, which is clearly delineate11 iii tJ,, 
legislative history and has thereby established a stmlll-
ard under which the Tax Commission and the Court ('<Iii 
apply the legislative intent to a gi,'en situation, m~ 111 _ 
lieve it is error for this Court to conclude that the statuti 
is clear and then substitute its own views for thosr i:r 
the legislature. 
And, in substituting its own views as to what tl1~ 
legislature intended, we believe the court has committed 
further error for the follo-vving reasons: First, the scupt 
and meaning of the exclusion from the statute inrolnrl 
was determined solely by resorting to the dictionary. 
Second, the Comi held that the legislature intended t11 
exclude from the broadest definition of "commercial." 
which includes all business activity, only that aspre: 
falling within the term ''industrial.'' (Green Sheet, pag1" 
4) Thus, instead of interpreting "commercial" the Corn: 
turns to the construction of the word "industrial" t1' 
decide this case. 
This approach makes the sole basis of statuton ,.,,; 
struction in Utah a literal reading of the dictionary 
places an impossible burden on the legislative drnft· 
man. If he does not include his own definition of term' 
in the statute he is bound bv Webster despite whatrn1 ' . 
extrinsic eddence is available as to what the lrg-islatiw 
was trying to do. 
Such an approach has also produced in thi~ ca:--1'/ 
overly restricted and unduly limited area of exrilll' 11 ' · 
9 
l1r :qipl:·ing a strict construction to !he term "indus-
1ri1ii," i.c>., fabrication of merchandise, and a very broad 
,) 1·fi11ition to "commercial," i.e., all business activity 
1\rept fabrication. This is the nry antithesis of the 
;1pplicatio11 of normal and customary rules of statutory 
1·1111structio11 to tax statutes. And, the upshot is the 
1·rro11Pons placement of the railroad industry into the 
"1·nmrnercial" category. 
ln cases of this kind the Court is to construe the 
l;1i1piage imposing the tax strictly against the taxing 
:111thority and, should "resolve doubts in favor of the 
tnxpnyrr." The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Com-
11011.11 v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 
jj (l1tah, 1964). 
Iii his dissenting opm10n to the Commission's 
1lecision, Commissioner Gunther succinctly and clearly 
<inalp~es this point at page 72 of the Record where he 
>tnte~: 
''It appears .fo me that sales tax upon coal, 
fuel oil and other fuel is not a tax of general 
imposition with specific and defined exemption, 
hut rather, because of the peculiar wording of the 
sretions of the Sales Tax Act relating to these 
substances, a tax of limited imposition. The 
Legislature in Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, Hl53, did not define the areas of exemption 
hut rather defined in the following language the 
arpa of taxation: 
'' (a) The sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels 
shall not be subject to the tax except 
as hereinafter provided. 
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"(b) (2) To d f" any person as e med i11 thi, 
act including municipal corporati1J1,. 
for gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel ni! 
or other fuels sold or furnished f111 
domestic or commercial rons11m11ti1J)!, 
''If the Legislature had intended to hroa!]p11 
the tax to include such activities as those pvr 
formed by the railroad in this case, it could ra,ih 
have done so by imposing- a tax and defining- are,1. 
of exemption. This it did not do. Therefore. 1111 _ 
der general rules of tax statute constructio11, tb1 
tax imposition, being specific, must be stridl1 
construed. · 
"Because this tax is of limited and enrefnlh 
defined imposition, it necessarily follows that an; 
uncertainty or ambiguity as to whether or 11nt 
imposition is appropriate in a given fact situatio11 
must needs be resolved in fayor of the taxpa)tr 
and against the taxing authority." 
It would appear to us that in applying the customan 
rule of statutory construction, the Court should pr011t·rh 
consider "commercial" in its strict sense and "indu; 
trial" in its broad sense, or in a reverse orclur to th 
method which was followed by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER OR IN IGNORING THE STIP-
ULATED FACTS IN THE RECORD WHICH 
ESTABLISH THAT THE LEGISLATUm; 
INTENDED TO EXCLUDE THE BUSINES~ 
OF RAILROADING FROM THE scorJ>; 
AND MEANING OF THE WORD "COM-
MERCIAL" IN THE STATUTE. 
11 
'l'lw OJH'11i11g remarks on the first page of The United 
.\lalr8 J,a11 1 Week, for the week of March 21, 1967, 34 
L\\'. :;:32;), state: 
"Mr. Justice Holmes once wryly commented 
that in a moment of indiscretion he had told coun-
sel arguing the intention of the legislature that 
'I don't care what their intention was. I only 
11 ant to know what the words mean.' " 
Without intending any disrespect, it would appear 
!!tat the Court's Opinion in this case is a very apt illus-
1 mt ion of ~fr. J usticc Holmes' comment. After reaching 
the erroneous conclusion that the statute is clear and 
rertai11, the Court has no difficulty in brushing aside 
lltr facts in the record which establish, insofar as 
llH' present ease is eoncerned, exactly what the legisla-
ture had in mind in its enactment of Chapter 93, Laws 
111' rtalt 1948. Instead, the Court looks to the dictionary 
for the mraning of the words. 
While refm;ing to recognize the facts in the record, 
1li1.· Court rather incongruously expresses interest in 
knowing "·lint "·as said by the sponsors of and the com-
u1ittccs whielt urged passage of the hill. It is, of course, 
11 l'll known that statements of sponsors of bills and com-
rnittPr·s Of rtah legislatures have never been permanently 
lN·unled until recent times, and therefore such informa-
liri11 i~ not arnilable in the present case. It is difficult 
11
' lliJf]erstand how that type of legislative history would 
1
'
1
' Hrwptahlc> to the Court, while the facts in the record, 
1111 id1 are jnst as meaningful, would not be acceptable. 
In a case where a statute is, in fact, clear 011 its fa['i•. 
we would agree that the meaning should be derived frum 
looking to the ordinary and every-day meanings of tliP 
statutory language. On the other hand, however, whw 
the language in a statute is not clear, as in the presi•nt 
case, as has been demonstrated under Point I, it would , 
appear that the Court should properly consider all 11f 
the available legislative background material. I'coy, 
Board of Ediication of Provo City School District, ]j 
Utah 2d 63, 377 P. 2d 490 (Utah, 1962); and Cil11 11! 
Mesa v. Killingsworth, 394 P. 2d 410 (Ariz., 196Ji 
See also Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2i! 
337, 410 P. 2d 831, (Utah, 1966), which recitPs the 1Jn~i1 
overriding rule in the interpretation of every statute 
"Wnat was the intent of the legisbture? All of tl11 
rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it nl!ll 
are helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining tk: 
objective." 
The sta.tute with which we are concerned in tlii' 
case was enacted in its present form as Chapter 0:. 
Laws of Utah, 1943, effective March 18, 1943. (R. lR 1 
That ·was the first time that the exemption for non 
commercial consumption was afforded to solid fu(!' 
The amendment was for the purpose of remori1 1 ~ .• 
the discrimination which has resulted to Utah 
producers, fuel oil producers, and other fuels pr" 
ducers from the tax on the sales of such coal, fuel cii! 
' 
and other fuels made for reasons other than dornem 
or commercial. (R. 19) At that time the initial stahlf1• ' 
which was borrowed from the Federal Rrvenue Ad " 
1932, had been on the statute books of this state for ori·' 
13 
if'11 Yenrs, and during that period there was a cleare11t 
"ml uniform construction of the language of the statu~t>, 
1iliieh clearly excluded railroads from the scope of "com-
mercial cornmmption. '' 
Page 19 of the Record includes the following stipu-
:ation of fact: 
"In its consideration and enactment of Chap-
ter 93, Laws of Utah, 1943, the legislature had 
lief ore it and relied upon the prior construction 
of the language, 'domestic and commercial con-
sumption' as passed by it in the original enact-
ment of the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, and 
as amended, together with the Commission's regu-
lations heretofore set forth which were issued in 
definition and construction thereof by the Com-
mission." (Emphasis Added) 
,\ml ,,·hat was the construction of the original 
amendment in 19331 
Tlie tax imposed upon energy sold for commercial 
consumption did not include energy sold to railroads. 
1R. 13) 
And what wa<> the Commission's regulation? 
"All gas, electricity or heat furnished the con-
sumer is taxable except: ... 
''That furnished for other uses which likewise 
cannot be classed as domestic or commercial, such 
as ... railroads .... " (R. 17) 
\\'l' ~nbmit that a reference to and the application 
11f ilie for0going facts from the legislative history of 
Chapter 93 iR indispensable in establishing the proper 
"'~i>lati\P intent in this case and that the Court was in 
' 
'iTiir in failillg to do so. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
All counsel involved in this case are fully a wan• 1]i;i' 
this Court does not favor unwarranted use of reheariit" 
procedures. Nevertheless, for the reasons diReuRser1 ii. 
this brief, we believe this important a])(1 far n·Helti11: 
case deserves a rehearing. \Ve therefore n'spcctfulh 
invoke further thought and reconsideration by the Co1111 
on the points raised herein. 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
A. U. MINER 
HO\VARD F. CORAY 
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600 Union Pacific Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plai1di11 
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;.;rr .\ 'J'E:'.\rB~NT OF A:'.\IICI CURIAE 
'l'he ulldersigned companies and eounsel have joinrd 
;11 1 lri,, lirid' not simply becanse of the effect the result 
111 tlris l'HSC will have upon their respective operations, 
l1n1 primarily heeause of the rules of law applied by the 
1'11nrt. \Ye have not found persuasive authority which 
1111lt1.s that a dictionary definition is entitled to greater 
,,,.1g]i1 in statutory construction than established legis-
l:itin: iJ1tc11t eoupled with consistent administrative con-
muction over a long period of time. The Court's decision 
111 1liis e<1sc appears to be contrary to the main stream 
ilr·ei~ioui:i arnl coneepts of long standing applied in Anglo-
:-111::011 jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, we respectfully JOlll m the conclusion 
:111rl urg-L' this ( 'ourt to grant the foregoing Petition. 
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